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Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce 
investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built 
indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,004 firms from 38 countries in 1990-2006, we find that 
stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, but does not affect investment in non-family firms. 
Moreover, as the model predicts, inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession.  
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Recent international evidence highlights the importance of family-owned firms: 45 percent of 
publicly listed international firms are family-owned (Rafael La Porta et al.  1999), and even in 
the United States, the presence of family firms is significant, counting almost one third of 
S&P500 firms and 37 percent of the Fortune 500 (Ronald C. Anderson, Sattar A. Mansi, and 
David M. Reeb 2003, and Belen Villalonga and Raphael Amit 2006). So it is not surprising 
that a growing body of empirical literature focuses on the performance of family firms, and in 
particular on how it is affected by intergenerational transfers of control. 
Two main problems associated with intergenerational succession have been investigated. 
First, the heir may not be as talented as the founder or a market professional, which may 
constrain the family firm’s growth and profitability compared to non-family firms (see Mike 
Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei Shleifer 2003, and Francesco Caselli and Nicola 
Gennaioli 2005). Second, family infighting may paralyze decision-making or lead to 
underperformance: for instance, Marianne Bertrand et al.  (2008) show, with reference to Thai 
family firms, that control by a larger number of male siblings is associated with poorer 
performance.
1 Various measures of firm performance (return on assets, market-to-book ratios 
and management practices) tend to deteriorate when control is passed from the founder to a 
descendant (Morten Bennedsen et al. 2007, Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen 2007, Rudi 
Fahlenbrach 2005, Daniel McConaughy et al. 1998, Randall Morck, Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny 1988, and Francisco Perez-Gonzalez 2006). 
In this paper we concentrate on another reason why succession may slow growth and 
investment or even lead to liquidation: the rights that inheritance norms confer on non-
controlling heirs over the founder’s estate reduce the firm’s ability to pledge future income 
                                                 
1 Marianne Bertrand and Antoinette Schoar (2006) note that conflict in the wake of succession is particularly 
frequent when several siblings are involved in the family firm: “cooperation between siblings can be difficult to 
achieve, despite parental will. Even if strong ties originally exist between family members, daily interactions 
within the context of the family business may lead to brutal infighting. Indeed, there are many examples of 
families (and their businesses) ripped apart from such infighting.” (p. 79-80). The negative performance effects 
of family conflicts on business performance are also documented in the business literature on family firms (see 
for instance Peter S. Davis and Paula D. Harveston 2001, and Grant Gordon and Nigel Nicholson 2008).  2
streams to external financiers and so constrain its ability to fund investment. The larger the 
portion assigned to non-controlling heirs, the smaller the part left to the one designated to 
remain at the helm. Absent any friction in capital markets, less wealth of the controlling heir 
would not affect the family firm’ ability to borrow and invest. But if there are capital market 
imperfections, it could hinder investment. This effect of inheritance law is empirically 
testable, as heirs’ legal rights differ widely around the world. In countries with a common law 
tradition, there are no restrictions on the fraction of assets that can be bequeathed to any heir, 
while in civil law countries such legal restrictions generally exist but vary considerably.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we present a model to explain how 
inheritance law and financing constraints should be expected to interact and affect the 
investment and growth of family firms. Second, we measure the extent to which inheritance 
law constrains the intergenerational transmission of wealth within families around the world. 
Third, we test the model’s main prediction using firm-level data on investment and growth in 
different countries. 
The baseline version of our model posits a firm that the founder bequeaths to his children, 
entrusting control to one of them. The controlling shareholder can appropriate a fraction of the 
cash flow as private benefits at the expense of other shareholders and financiers, to an extent 
determined by the degree of investor protection. The amount of investment that the firm can 
undertake depends on investor protection (more external finance is available when private 
benefits are reduced) and on the controlling shareholder’s wealth, as in Bengt Holmstrom and 
Jean Tirole (1997). By reducing the controlling heir’s wealth, restrictive inheritance law can 
limit the firm’s ability to invest. We show that when legal investor protection is very strong, 
the firm can finance the first-best level of investment, irrespective of inheritance law 
restrictions. But, as legal investor protection worsens, stricter inheritance law reduces 
investment, because the resources paid out to non-controlling heirs cannot be compensated by 
external finance.  3
We also explore the robustness of these predictions to several extensions of the model. 
First, we show that inheritance tax reduces the investment of family firms. This effect is the 
stronger, the weaker investor protection. In another extension, we relax the baseline model’s 
assumption that the firm’s assets can be partially liquidated at no cost. Our conclusions still 
hold under the assumption of inefficient partial liquidation. In this setup, instead of cash the 
non-controlling heir is given a financial claim over the firm’s cash flow. The larger the stake 
of the non-controlling heir, the lesser the firm’s ability to raise funds on capital markets. Thus, 
as before, a stricter inheritance law reduces investment. The only additional insight is that in 
this case, if investor protection is very weak, the value of the financial claim of the non-
controlling heir may fall below the minimal threshold set by inheritance law. In this case the 
family is forced to liquidate the entire firm, even though this does not maximize total family 
wealth. We also explore how inheritance constraints affect the transition from family to non-
family firm. If keeping the firm in the family also yields non-monetary benefits of control, 
and if family are distinguished from non-family firms only by the inheritance constraint, then 
the stringency of the constraint makes the family less likely to retain control.  
Our next step is to assess whether the evidence is consistent with the model’s main 
prediction: that family firms’ investment and growth are diminished by the legal limits on the 
wealth that can be bequeathed to a single heir (whereas this does not hold for non-family 
firms), and that this effect is stronger where investor protection is weaker. For the empirical 
test, we collect data on inheritance law in 64 countries, mainly via questionnaires sent to law 
firms participating in the Lex Mundi project. We define and measure the “permissiveness” of 
a country’s inheritance law as the largest share of the estate that can be bequeathed to a single 
child, depending on the presence or absence of a spouse and the total number of children. 
Because this maximum share binds the testator’s actions, it cannot be exceeded via inter vivos 
donations: heirs can generally challenge donations in breach of their rights in court. 
Inheritance law is also binding in another sense: almost everywhere the median household  4
headed by a wealthy entrepreneur has more than one child, so in most cases the choice of a 
controlling heir and of his (or her) stake is not a trivial decision.  
We then test the effect of this variable on the investment and growth of family firms, 
using a sample of 10,004 family and non-family firms from 38 countries between 1990 and 
2006. In our baseline regression, we include fixed country and industry effects but can still 
identify the effect of inheritance law on investment by exploiting the differential effect on 
family and non-family firms. In line with our model’s predictions, we find that more 
permissive inheritance law is associated with greater investment in family firms, and that this 
effect is amplified in countries that also feature better investor protection.  
Our second test is based on a methodology similar to that used by Raghuram G. Rajan and 
Luigi Zingales (1998), adapted to our data (firm-level rather than industry-level) and our 
focus on the investment impact of inheritance law and investor protection.  We regress the 
investment rate of each firm (averaged over our time interval) on Rajan and Zingales’ 
indicator of financial dependence, interacted with our measure of inheritance law 
permissiveness, a measure of investor protection, and the product of these two variables, 
controlling for country and industry fixed effects. This methodology enables us to test not 
only whether inheritance law matters for family firm investment but also whether it is 
indifferent (as expected) for non-family firm investment. This further implication of the 
model also finds support in the data: permissive inheritance law enhances investment only in 
family firms. 
To probe the data further, we split the sample of family firms into a group that undergo a 
succession and those that do not, since inheritance laws should be relevant mainly when there 
is an intergenerational transfer of control. The data are consistent with this hypothesis as well. 
Finally, we estimate a panel regression with firm fixed effects on the sub-sample of family 
firms to test whether their investment declines in the wake of a succession and whether such  5
decline is attenuated in countries where inheritance law is more permissive and investor 
protection is stronger. Again, these predictions are borne out by the data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we present the baseline model 
and derive its predictions on how inheritance law affects the firm’s investment and the 
family’s liquidation decision for different degrees of investor protection. Section II sets out 
various extensions, mainly aimed at testing robustness. Section III presents the data, Section 
IV explains the empirical strategy and reports the estimates, and Section V concludes. 
 
 
I. The Model 
We consider a firm that is initially owned by its founder, who has two prospective heirs, 
denoted 1 and 2.
2 The firm is the combination of physical assets, whose scrap value is 
normalized to 1, and entrepreneurial “know-how”. The founder’s wealth is entirely invested 
in the firm’s physical assets. Only the founder and heir 1 have the know-how to run the firm.
3 
All parties have linear utility and no discounting: they simply maximize their final wealth. 
We assume a perfectly competitive capital market, and for simplicity standardize the 
equilibrium interest rate to zero. 
 
A. Baseline Model Structure 
We start by laying out the baseline version of the model, leaving extensions to Section II. The 
model’s time line is shown in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
                                                 
2 We take the number of children as given, that is, not determined by rational considerations by the founder. 
3 If both heirs had the same managerial talent, there would be no trade-off in this model. But if we assume that in 
addition to heir 1 an outside manager also has the talent to run the company, the firm could be sold to the latter 
as a going concern at a value that exceeds the scrap value of its physical assets. In terms of our example, the 
founder could not only sell the firm’s assets but also transmit its know-how to the acquirer, and distribute the 
sale proceeds among the two heirs. We explore this extension in Section II.C.  6
Family succession. – We assume that the firm’s physical assets can be liquidated on a perfect 
secondary market (at their scrap value of 1) and are perfectly divisible. Thus partial 
liquidation is feasible and efficient, an assumption made only for simplicity that will be 
relaxed in Section II B.  
At  0 t = , the founder retires and decides how much to leave to each of his heirs. As all of 
family’s wealth is invested in the firm, the founder liquidates a fraction x and bequeaths the 
proceeds to heir 2 (who invests it on the financial market at zero rate of return). The 
remaining fraction 1 x −  goes to heir 1, who is now the manager of the firm. Equivalently, 
instead of receiving the proceeds from this partial liquidation, heir 2 may be given a financial 
claim of value x over time-2 cash flow, such as an equity or debt stake. The two arrangements 
(partial liquidation and retention of heir 2 within the investor base) are completely equivalent 
when partial liquidation is efficient.
4 For ease of exposition, we stick to the first interpretation.  
The founder apportions the bequest between the heirs, choosing x so as to maximize their 
total wealth:
 5 
12 f ww w = + ,       ( 1 )  
The distinctive feature of the model is that the law constrains the founder’s ability to allocate 
assets among his heirs. As we shall see in Section III, in many countries the law sets a 
minimum share of the estate that each heir must receive.  We capture this legal constraint by 
assuming that the founder must assign a minimum fraction u of total wealth to the non-
controlling heir, that is,  2 wx u =≥, and therefore entitles heir 2 to challenge any 
                                                 
4 The intuitive reason for this is that, when heir 2 remains within the investor base, he can still demand that 
future cash flows corresponding to his shares (or bonds) be paid out to him and not be pledged to external 
financiers. In practice, this requires that heir 2’s claims cannot be diluted by those of the external financiers. So 
external financiers cannot count on the cash flows earmarked to heir 2, but only on those accruing to heir 1 (net 
of private benefits) to recover their money. 
5 Our objective function excludes the possibility that the founder may have a preference for fairness in the 
treatment of the two heirs. We discuss this point in Section II.E.  7
apportionment of the estate that does not satisfy this condition in court.
6 Henceforth we shall 
refer to 1 u −  (the maximum fraction that can be bequeathed to the controlling heir) as a 
measure of the “permissiveness of inheritance law”. For instance, totally permissive 
legislation would make this measure equal to 1, so that the controlling heir can inherit the 
entire firm. 
 
Investment technology. – At  1 t = , heir 1 decides how much to invest and therefore how much 
funding to raise on the capital market. The investment I is funded by heir 1’s wealth 1 x −  plus 
external funds. Investors are given a claim  I R  over the firm’s cash flow. This claim can be 
thought of as debt or non-voting equity. For clarity we stick to the first interpretation. Each 
unit of capital costs 1, and at  2 t =  yields revenue 1 g +  (for  0 g > ), up to a critical level I .
7  
Therefore, the firm’s revenue is 
     








     (2) 
Clearly, it is inefficient to expand capital beyond the scale I . To focus on the interesting 
case, the maximal efficient scale is taken to exceed the family’s initial wealth, i.e.  1 I > . 
 
Private benefits of control. – At  2 t =  heir 1, being in control, decides on the allocation of 
revenues, either paying them out to shareholders or diverting them as private benefits (by 
outright theft or else, more subtly, by transactions with related parties, transfer pricing, 
perquisites consumption or excessive salaries). This non-contractible expropriation decision is 
modeled as the choice of a fraction  [0,1] φ ∈  of the revenues, so that private benefits are  R φ  
and security benefits to all claimholders are (1 )R φ − . 
                                                 
6 Generally, inheritance laws refer to the value of assets at  0 t = (without incorporating future improvements in 
value). However, our model would not be significantly affected if the fraction u were defined with reference of 
the final value of the firm, taking into account the future gains from investment.  
7 The assumption of a linear production function with an upper bound on investment is made only for simplicity. 
Our results would be qualitatively unchanged if the production function featured decreasing marginal returns.   8
The law limits expropriation of outside investors, thus setting an upper bound  [0,1] φ ∈  on 
the revenues that can be diverted. Therefore, 1 φ −  measures the minimum fraction of the 
firm’s cash flow that must be disgorged to investors by law; accordingly, we term this the 
measure of “investor protection”. The assumption that the legal degree of investor protection 
affects external finance to firms concords with a large body of evidence (see Thorsten Beck 
and Ross Levine 2005, and Ulrike Malmendier 2009, for recent surveys ).  
 
B. Effect of Inheritance Law on Family Firm Investment 
To analyze the founder’s problem, we solve the model by backward induction: we start from 
the expropriation decision at  2 t =  to obtain the investment level I at  1 t = , and from this we 
determine the optimal fraction x of the firm’s assets liquidated at  0 t = . This yields the 
founder’s welfare and the effect of the inheritance constraint on investment for different 
degrees of investor protection φ . 
At  2 t = , heir 1 decides how to apportion the revenues.  The law obliges him to divert no 
more than  R φ  as private benefits. As diversion is costless, heir 1 extracts the maximum 
benefit allowed, so that the firm’s pledgeable income becomes (1 ) (1 )(1 ) Rg I φφ −= −+.  
Since the capital market is perfectly competitive, heir 1 appropriates the entire surplus 
generated by the investment. Moreover, as each dollar of investment generates a profit  0 g > , 
he wants to invest as much as possible (up to  I ): investment I is constrained only by the 
volume of fund-raising. The investors’ cash flow rights  I R  cannot exceed the firm’s 
pledgeable income:  (1 )(1 ) I R gI φ ≤− + . As heir 1 can contributes only 1 x −  to the firm’s 
capital, he must raise  (1 ) Ix −−  from investors, whose participation constraint is therefore 
) 1 ( x I RI − − = . The equality sign follows from the assumption that capital markets are perfectly 
competitive. Investment is maximized along with  I R , whose highest value is (1 )(1 ) g I φ −+.  9
Taken together, heir 1’s optimal investment choice and the investors’ participation constraint 
imply: 
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) g II x φ − += − − .     (3) 
As in Tirole (2006, Chapter 3), one must distinguish two cases: 
(i) Unconstrained investment: if (1 )(1 ) 1 g φ +− ≥ , one dollar invested generates at least one 
dollar of pledgeable income, so there is no upper bound on external fund-raising: heir 1 
will choose the maximal efficient investment level I .  
(ii) Finance-constrained investment: if (1 )(1 ) 1 g φ + −< , one dollar invested generates less 
than one dollar of pledgeable income, so that external funding is determined by the 
investors’ participation constraint. So investment is given by equation (3): 
(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] Ix g φ =− −+ − , and heir 1 can borrow up to 
(1 )(1 )(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] xg g φ φ −+− − +− . In other words, for every dollar of his wealth 1 x −  
invested in the firm, heir 1 can borrow an additional amount 
(1 )(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] gg φ φ +− − +− , which is increasing in profitability g and investor 
protection 1 φ − . Borrowing capacity will be used to the full if investment is below the 
efficient scale I . Thus investment is
 8 
        
1
min , .







          (4) 
Knowing heir 1’s optimal investment at t = 1, we now turn to the founder’s succession 
decision at t = 0, i.e. the fraction x of assets to be liquidated to pay heir 2, under the 
inheritance constraint  2 wx u =≥.  
                                                 
8 When investment is financially constrained, it is optimal for heir 1 to retain no cash flow right in the family 
firm. This conclusion may seem to conflict with the assumption that he retains control. The assumption that cash 
flow rights and voting rights can be perfectly separated, while extreme, is made only for simplicity. If the family 
must keep a minimum fraction of cash flow rights to retain control, the parameter region where investment is 
constrained expands: intuitively, the family’s control stake reduces the fraction of the firm’s income that can be 
pledged to external investors, and therefore the external funds that can be raised. By the same token, the larger 
the minimum control stake, the lower the investment that the firm can carry out if it is finance-constrained.   10
Recall that by equation (1) the founder’s utility is simply the sum of his children’s final 
wealth  12 ww + . Since heir 1’s utility is his initial wealth, 1 x − , plus the profit from the 
investment, that is, 
1
1
(1 ) min ,








and heir 2’s utility is his wealth  2 wx = , the founder’s utility (and the firm’s final value) is  
  
1
1m i n ,








.        (5) 
Since this expression is weakly decreasing in x, the (weakly) dominant strategy for the 
founder is to set  x u = , that is, liquidate the smallest possible amount of the family firm’s 
assets needed to satisfy the inheritance constraint. To summarize: 
PROPOSITION 1. If the firm remains under family control, then a fraction u of its assets is 
liquidated, its investment is  { } min ,(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] II u g φ =− − + −  and the founder’s welfare is 
{ } 1 min ,(1 )/[1 (1 )(1 )] . f wg I u g φ =+ − − + −  
This proposition implies that the firm can achieve the efficient level of investment I  if  
1[ 1 ( 1 ) / ] / ( 1 ) uI g φ −≥−− + . The unconstrained region defined by this condition is represented 
in Figure 2 as the area above the downward-sloping line.  As shown by the figure, for any 
given degree of inheritance law permissiveness 1 u − , there is a degree of investor protection 
1 φ −  strong enough that the inheritance law imposes no efficiency loss. This is most clear in 
the limiting case of perfect investor protection, 11 φ − = , where the previous condition is 
always met (recalling that  1 I >  by assumption) and we are above the vertical intercept in 
Figure 2: absent agency problems between firm and investors, even a controlling heir with 
very low wealth can raise the funds required to invest at the efficient level.  11
[Insert Figure 2] 
If, instead, investor protection falls short of this level, i.e. 1[ 1 ( 1 ) / ] / ( 1 ) uI g φ − <−− + , 
then the inheritance law constrains the controlling heir to a suboptimal level of investment: 
weak investor protection prevents him from fully offsetting his wealth shortfall by external 
funding to achieve the efficient investment level. In this constrained region, which 
corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 2, (i) more permissive inheritance law (greater 1 u − ) 
reduces the share of family assets that must be liquidated and so increases investment and the 
founder’s utility, (ii) stronger investor protection enhances investment, and (iii) its positive 
effect is greater, the more permissive is inheritance law. These results follow from the fact 
that in this region the following derivatives are positive: 
















,    
2
2 (1 )







,             (6) 
where for brevity we define  1/[1 (1 )(1 )] kg φ ≡− +− .  
These results are summarized in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2.  If investor protection is weak (1[ 1 ( 1 ) / ] / ( 1 ) uI g φ − <−− + ), then more 
permissive inheritance law increases the investment of family firms. This effect is increasing 
in the degree of investor protection. If instead investor protection is strong 
(1[ 1 ( 1 ) / ] / ( 1 ) uI g φ −≥−− + ), more permissive inheritance law has no effect on investment. 
As these predictions are to be tested empirically later in the paper, it is worth noticing that 
they only apply to family firms: for non-family firms, the effect of inheritance law should be 
nil regardless of the degree of investor protection.
9  
 
                                                 
9 This does not rule out that the degree of investor protection per se may affect investment also in non-family 
firms, insofar as these firms too face agency problems in raising external funds – which however are not 
modelled in this setting.  12
II. Extensions and Robustness 
In the baseline model just analyzed, we made a number of stark simplifying assumptions. 
Here, we remove several of these, both to test the robustness of the predictions and to bring 
out some interesting new implications. We also briefly discuss an issue that we have 
neglected so far, i.e. how inheritance law and shareholder protection affect the family’s 
decision to keep control over the company or sell it out altogether. 
 
A. Inheritance Taxes 
So far we have assumed that the founder can bequeath his entire wealth, but of course many 
countries levy estate taxes. If we denote by τ  the tax rate on bequests, the wealth transmitted 
by the founder to his heirs is only a fraction 1 τ −  of the bequest.
10 The other variable affected 
by the estate tax is the wealth that must be assigned to heir 2, which decreases from u  to 
(1 ) u τ − .
11  
By the same steps as in the previous analysis, it is easily shown that the level of 
investment is  { } min ,(1 )(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] II u g τ φ =− − − + − . The tax has two effects on the level 
of family firm investment: first, it amplifies the region where investment is below the first-
best level; second, in the region where investment is constrained, both its level and its 
sensitivity to inheritance law is decreased by a factor 1 τ − . To sum up, the main empirical 
predictions of this extension are that inheritance taxes reduce the amount of investment by 




                                                 
10 Inheritance taxes may also affect the allocation of consumption across generations, as they make the heir’s 
consumption more costly. This may translate into greater consumption by the founder, so that the wealth 
transmitted to the heir becomes 1 c τ −−, where c is the extra-consumption by the founder.  
11 If there is extra-consumption by the founder, this term becomes  (1 ) uc τ − − .   13
B. Inefficient Partial Liquidation 
So far we have made the extreme assumption that the firm’s assets are perfectly divisible, so 
that any fraction can be sold without reducing liquidation value. In practice, however, firms’ 
assets are imperfectly divisible. That is, a fraction x of the assets may be worth less than x 
times their value when undivided. Here we consider the extreme case where the liquidation 
value of any fraction  1 x <  of the assets is zero. 
Inefficient partial liquidation implies that it is never optimal to liquidate a fraction of the 
assets in order to compensate heir 2. It is more efficient to satisfy the inheritance law 
constraint by assigning him a financial claim. Since heir 2 can seek legal redress against any 
offer that violates his right, the value of this claim must be at least equal to u. For instance, 
heir 2 could be given a debt claim  2 R u =  with a covenant that prevents heir 1 from issuing 
more senior debt. Alternatively, he can be given an equity stake if heir 1 pledges not to dilute 
its value below u by issuing more equity. 
The only modification needed to the time line is at  0 t = : if the founder turns control over 
to heir 1, heir 2 gets a claim on  2 R out of the firm cash flow at  2 t = .  As before, at t = 2 heir 1 
extracts all the private benefits allowed by legal protection, that is,  (1 ) g I φ + . Anticipating his 
decision, the investors’ participation constraint at t = 1 is  
1 I R I ≥−, 
which is binding in equilibrium as capital markets are perfectly competitive. This implies that 
all the surplus generated by the investment is captured by heir 1, and since each unit of 
investment generates a positive net present value, he wants to invest as much as possible (up 
to  I ). His funding capacity is limited by the amount of income he can pledge to outside 
investors:  I R  cannot exceed the pledgeable income (1 )(1 ) g I φ −+ less heir 2’s claim,  2 R . 
Formally,  2 (1 )(1 ) I Rg I R φ ≤− + −.
  Since investment is maximized along with  I R , also this 
constraint is binding. Combining it with the investors’ participation constraint yields   14
2 (1 )(1 ) 1. gI R I φ − +− = −  
As in the baseline model, we must distinguish two cases: 
(i)  If (1 )(1 ) 1 g φ +− ≥  the firm can raise any amount of funding it wishes, so it will invest I . 
Heir 2’s inheritance constraint is satisfied whenever  2 R u ≥ . In this case  1 f wg I =+ .  
(ii) If (1 )(1 ) 1 g φ +− < , the firm’s external funding capacity is limited, and to maximize 
investment, the founder must maximize the income pledged to outside financiers, 
2 (1 )(1 ) I Rg I R φ =− + −. Hence the inheritance constraint is binding:  2 R u = . Then the 
claim that can be given to outside investors is  (1 )(1 ) I Rg I u φ = −+− , which together with 
their participation constraint yields (1 )(1 ) (1 ) g II u φ − += − − .  
It is easy to see that the investment in the constrained regime is again given by expression 
(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] ug φ −− + − , obtained under the assumption of no liquidation costs. The reason is 
that heir 2 is exactly like any other outside investor in the family firm. It is as if the family 
wealth invested in the firm were only  u − 1 , i.e., heir 1’s wealth. Heir 1’s capacity to raise 
external funding is unchanged, and equal to  (1 ) Iu − − .  
Finally, we have to check that heir 2’s participation constraint, (1 ) (1 ) g Iu φ + −≥  is indeed 
satisfied: the firm’s pledgeable income must at least equal the funds contributed by heir 2 by 
leaving his stake u invested in the firm.
12  Upon replacing I with the expression for investment 
in the financially constrained regime, it is apparent that heir 2’s participation constraint is 
satisfied only for 1/ ( 1 ) ug φ −≥ + . If instead 1/ ( 1 ) ug φ − <+ , the firm’s pledgeable income is 
not even be sufficient to repay heir 2. In this case, the company must be liquidated to satisfy 
the inheritance constraint. This is inefficient, since if the company were not liquidated it 
would add gI  to the family’s wealth. 
                                                 
12 Otherwise he would force liquidation of the firm’s assets.  15
In conclusion, the additional insight from the presence of inefficient partial liquidation is 
that if investor protection is sufficiently weak, the founder is forced to liquidate, since 
pledgeable income is insufficient to give heir 2 a stake large enough to meet the inheritance 
constraint. 
 
C. The Decision to Sell 
So far heir 1 was assumed to be the only agent able to manage the firm after the founder’s 
demise. Now we relax this assumption by considering outsiders who have the same 
managerial ability as heir 1 and may therefore be willing to buy the firm as a going concern.  
Since the inheritance constraint limits the firm’s ability to raise external funds, selling it to an 
external acquirer not bound by the constraint on investment may be more appealing. Indeed, if 
the firm can be sold at its fair value, this option will always dominate when investment would 
be constrained under family management.  
But a trade-off will arise if the firm cannot be sold at its fair value, for instance because 
the market for corporate control is not competitive: the family will be ready to sell at the 
required discount only if retaining control would imply facing a severe constraint on 
investment. A similar trade-off is present if keeping the firm within the family generates an 
“amenity potential” (a non-pecuniary benefit of control).
13 If the amenity potential exceeds 
the firm’s competitive price, obviously the family will retain control. But if it is below that 
price, the family will sell only if keeping the firm under its control would severely limit 
investment. As we know from the previous analysis, the firm’s investment is severely 
                                                 
13 This term was introduced by Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn (1985). Unlike the private benefits of control, 
the amenity potential gives utility to the party in control without reducing profits and the firm’s value. For 
instance, the founder may draw pleasure from having his child manage the firm. Alternatively, in some 
industries, such as media or sports, firm ownership allows the family to be a member of important political or 
social networks.  16
constrained if inheritance law is very restrictive. So strict inheritance law makes families 
more likely to sell, other things equal.
14 
This result is relevant for our empirical analysis – it implies that even family firm status 
itself is affected by inheritance law. In countries with stricter inheritance law, we should 
observe fewer firms under family control. Since in this parameter region investment is 
predicted to be most severely constrained, this sample selection should bias the evidence 
against finding an effect of inheritance law on investment by family firms. However, the 
market discount or the amenity potential might be higher in countries with strict inheritance 
law. If so, the sample selection would tend to bias the evidence in the opposite direction, 
amplifying the investment effect.   
 
D. Shared Control 
So far, we posited that the founder can confer control over the firm to one heir only. What 
would happen if heirs can share control? To answer this question, consider that control has 
two possible dimensions: (i) ability to extract private benefits and (ii) power to decide how 
much the firm should borrow and invest. 
Suppose first that shared control refers only to the ability to extract private benefits, so 
that heir 2 might be entitled to a fraction of them. This assumes that heir 2 has an 
informational advantage over outside investors that allows him to verify private benefit 
extraction, or else that heir 1 is altruistic and willingly accepts sharing the private benefits. 
Since in our setting private benefits have no deadweight cost, the two heirs will agree to 
extract the maximum benefit (1 )(1 ) gI φ −+. This leaves the firm’s borrowing and investment 
                                                 
14 In contrast, the effect of investor protection on the decision to sell is ambiguous: weak legal shareholder 
protection also constrains investment and thereby makes families more inclined to divest (just as stricter 
inheritance law), but it can also make it harder for an outside acquirer to raise funds for the acquisition, since it 
limits the funds that he can pledge to financiers. If the private wealth of the outside acquirer is not sufficient to 
fully compensate the family for the loss of the private benefits of control, the family may prefer to retain control. 
Otherwise said, weak legal shareholder protection lowers the family’s reservation sell price but may constrain 
the acquirer’s bid price, so that its effect on the likelihood of a sale cannot be signed.  17
capacity unaffected, and simply confers a rent on heir 2 above his legal entitlement u. This 
argument rests on the premise that the wealth u to which heir 2 is entitled by the law refers 
solely to the cash flow generated by the firm, not to unverifiable private benefits. 
A more extreme interpretation of shared control is that the heirs jointly decide investment. 
This implies that heir 2 agrees to leave his stake u invested in the firm and to pledge the 
corresponding cash flow to outside investors, so as to maximize investment. Of course, this 
presupposes that heir 2 is confident of sharing in the private benefits of control so as to (at 
least) recover his investment u. If such an arrangement is feasible, the financially constrained 
level of investment rises from (1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] ug φ −− + −  to 1/[1 (1 )(1 )] g φ −+ − , and inheritance 
law will have no effect on the level of investment. 
In this extreme version, therefore, shared control completely offsets the effect of 
inheritance law. If this form of shared control is widespread in family firms, one should 
expect to find no effect of inheritance law on investment. However, this prediction rests on 
the premise that shared control is assisted by a high degree of trust within the family. In the 
presence of conflict between heirs, joint control may instead result in deadlocks and 
disagreements, which may impact on the firm profitability and thus curtail investment below 
its efficient level. Insofar as it leads to fragmented family ownership and thereby makes 
shared control more likely, a strict inheritance law may also increase the likelihood of 
squabbles in the management of family firms, and thereby hurt their investment and growth. 
Thus joint control does not per se remove a possible adverse effect of inheritance law on 
family firm investment. 
 
E. Fairness in Bequest Allocation 
Another assumption of the model is that the founder is interested only in the sum of his heirs’ 
wealth, not its distribution. And in fact, in the benchmark model distribution is inequitable: 
heir 2 gets a share  1/2 u≤  of the estate, heir 1 gets at least 1 u −  (which is what he gets when  18
the firm has zero borrowing ability). Thus if the founder cares for fairness, his bequest x to 
heir 2 will exceed the minimum u prescribed by the law. At the limit, a perfectly egalitarian 
split of the estate will require him to set heir 2’s stake at  (1 ) /[2(1 ) ] 1/ 2 xg g g φ φ = ++ − > , if 
the firm is in the financially constrained region ((1 )(1 ) 1 g φ + −> ): heir 2 must get more than 
half of the cash flow rights, since he is not going to enjoy the private benefits of control. 
Naturally, the more egalitarian the founder, the greater the efficiency cost in terms of 
forgone investment: intuitively, the egalitarianism of the founder is equivalent to a more 
stringent inheritance law constraint. This result highlights a potentially important caveat about  
the empirical relevance of our model’s predictions: if social norms generally dictate more 
fairness in inheritance than is required by law, then family firms’ investment will reflect 
international differences in social norms, not laws. In practice, social norms are likely to have 
some correlation with inheritance law, since typically law is an outgrowth of custom, as the 
history of both Roman and Common law makes clear. However, to the extent that the 
correlation is less than perfect, both social norms and laws may have a detectable effect. 
Empirically, this suggests that to estimate the effect of cross-country differences in 
inheritance law it is worthwhile to control for cross-country differences in social norms, as 
measured by the responses to international surveys. 
 
 
III. The Data 
In our empirical test we bring together two types of data: (i) measures of country-level 
institutional characteristics, which include novel indicators of the permissiveness of 
inheritance law, and measures of investor protection drawn from existing studies; and (ii) 
firm-level data for investment (capital expenditure), sales, total assets, market-to-book ratios,  19
ownership structure (cash flow rights of the blockholder and, wherever possible, voting 
rights) for a sample of companies in 38 countries. 
 
A. Inheritance Law and Investor Protection 
To measure the permissiveness of inheritance law around the world, we gathered information 
on the maximum share of the estate that a testator can bequeath to a single child in 64 
countries. The data were collected via questionnaires sent to law firms belonging to the Lex 
Mundi association and in some cases were drawn (or double-checked) from other sources, 
such as direct access to legal sources.
15 The question asked to the law firms was: “What is the 
maximum fraction of the estate that can be bequeathed to a single child depending on the 
number of children and on the presence of a surviving spouse?” The instructions made it clear 
that the question referred to the legal limits on a testator’s will, not to social norms. The 
resulting measure is shown in the first five columns of Table 1, where Panel A displays the 
figures for the 38 countries to be included in our regression analysis and Panel B those for 26 
more countries for which we were able to collect inheritance law information. In each 
country, this measure varies depending on the presence of a surviving spouse and of the total 
number of children.
16 It should be noticed that this maximum share binds the testator’s 
actions, as it cannot be exceeded via inter-vivos donations. The interdiction of donation in 
                                                 
15 We stress that the indicator refers to the maximum share that can be left to a single child conditional on 
writing a valid will, and not to the amount that a child would receive by a parent who dies intestate. 
16 For some countries, inheritance law is so complex that in computing the measure reported in Table 1 we had to 
make more specific assumptions about the case under consideration and/or disregard some clauses in the law that 
could not be captured by our simple indicator. Specifically: (i) for Bangladesh, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
we assume that heirs are all male, as in those countries male heirs receive twice as much as females; (ii) in 
Canada, we disregarded the case of Quebec, where 50 percent of the estate must go to the spouse of the 
deceased; (iii) for India, where the applicable law depends on the religion of the deceased, we focus on the 
norms of the Indian Succession Act, disregarding the more restrictive rules of the Hindu Succession and the 
Muslim law; (iv) for Slovakia, we assume that children are over 18 years of age (stricter rules apply for children 
below that age); (v) for Sweden, we disregard that the surviving spouse is entitled to € 17,750; (vi) in the United 
States, many states entitle the surviving spouse to an “elective share” which is generally 30 percent  but in some 
states can be up to 50 percent, but we disregarded this norm since it can be circumvented by setting up a trust. 
Moreover, we disregard the more restrictive laws of the state of Louisiana.  20
breach of heirs’ rights is often explicitly stated by the law, which allows the injured party to 
challenge any such donations in court.
17 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 clearly shows that the degree of permissiveness of inheritance law is greater in 
common law countries than in civil law ones: in most common law counties, there is complete 
freedom to leave one’s estate to a single child, irrespective of the presence of a spouse and of 
the number of siblings.
18 In contrast, in civil law countries the law limits the share that can be 
bequeathed to any child, and this limit is stricter if there are other siblings and/or a surviving 
spouse. For instance in Italy, a person with a spouse and two children can freely allocate only 
one fourth of his total wealth, so that he cannot give more than 50 percent of the family’s 
wealth to one child. The percentage goes down to 41.7 percent with three children, and 
decreases monotonically to 33.3 percent with six children (not shown for brevity). 
The legal limit that is likely to apply to the typical entrepreneur in the countries for which 
data are available is that corresponding to 2 children and a surviving spouse, shown in 
Column 4 of the table: as shown in Column 8, the median number of children of entrepreneurs 
(defined as self-employed workers or business owners) aged over 50 and earning more than 
the median income is 2, in twelve of the thirteen countries for which such data are available 
                                                 
17 Of the 38 countries used in our estimation, 26 set legal limits to a testator freedom. Using information drawn 
from the www.globalpropertyguide.com website, supplemented by other sources for some countries, we have 
verified that in 15 of these 26 countries (Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Japan, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Taiwan), the law states that a gift made between 
ascendants and descendants or spouses is interpreted as an advance payment of inheritance, and cannot deprive 
legal heirs of their rights. Heirs can challenge the donation in court, although the protection varies across 
countries: for example, it may be subject to different deadlines. Exceptions are South Korea, where there appear 
to be no limits to inter vivos donations, and Austria, where only donations made in the last two years before the 
testator’s death can be claimed by a heir entitled to a reserved portion of the estate. We could not find relevant 
information for the other 11 countries that limit testator freedom (Austria, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Iceland, 
the Netherlands, Peru, South Korea, Sweden, Uruguay and Venezuela). The remaining 12 countries of our 
sample (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Thailand, 
United Kingdom and U.S.A.) set no limit to a testator’s will (in Ireland, only if there is no surviving spouse). 
18 However, even in these countries social norms may de facto prevent a testator from neglecting altogether one 
or more of his/her children and his/her spouse. These social norms inspired to a minimal standard of equity 
among potential heirs are sometimes buttressed by judicial practice in some common law countries: for instance, 
in New Zealand a child or a spouse who has been neglected in the deceased will has some judicial remedies to 
redress the situation and obtain a share of the estate. But there are no general and clear guidelines regarding the 
circumstances in which such judicial remedies can be successfully used.  21
(the exception being Sweden, where the median number of children is 3).
19 In the estimation, 
we use this as the benchmark figure, but we check the robustness of our results by also 
considering the legal limits for 3 and 4 children – which are probably relevant in many cases, 
considering the frequency of multiple marriages and the implied number of children. 
That civil law countries have more restrictive inheritance laws is confirmed by Panels A 
and B of Table 2 where we report descriptive statistics for the 64 countries for which we have 
inheritance law data:
20 on average, in civil law countries the largest share that can be left to a 
child in the presence of a surviving spouse is 60 percent if there are two children and 54 
percent if there are three, while in common law countries the corresponding figure is 96 
percent in both cases. However, there is considerable variation in the figures for civil law 
countries. For instance, the range of variation is from 33.3 to 100 percent for the case of two 
children and a spouse, and from 25 to 100 percent for three children and a spouse.  
[Insert Table 2] 
The existence of some dispersion in this indicator within civil law countries is essential if 
empirically this variable is to serve as more than a mere indicator of the country’s type of 
legal order, and hence to be distinguished from measures of shareholder protection, which are 
known to be closely correlated with legal origin, i.e. the divide between common law and 
civil law countries (see La Porta et al. 1997, 1998).  Even more encouraging in this respect is 
that the correlation between the inheritance law indicators of Table 1 and measures of investor 
protection is far from perfect (Panel C of Table 2). For the case with 2 children and a 
surviving spouse, the inheritance indicator’s correlation with investor protection ranges from 
0.35 for the anti-director-rights measure by La Porta et al. (1998) and 0.53 for the self-dealing 
                                                 
19 This figure is drawn from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, from the English Longitudinal 
Study of the Ageing for the United Kingdom and from the Health and Retirement Study for the United States. 
20 The descriptive statistics for the 38 countries for which we have both inheritance law data and firm-level data 
and which are in our sample are very similar to the ones reported in Table 2.  22
index by Simeon Djankov et al. (2006) to 0.19 (and not significant) for the legality index 
defined by Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-François Richard (2003).
21  
One may wonder whether the legal limits in Table 1 are ever binding, considering the 
well-known evidence that in the U.S. estates tend to be split equally among children. 
However, this evidence does not apply to entrepreneurs, as noted by Paul L. Menchik 
(1980).
22 This is crucial for our model, which considers only the bequest behavior of 
entrepreneurs, and not of the population at large. Furthermore, in the U.S. inter vivos transfers 
are considerably more unequally distributed than bequests.
23 
Even more importantly for our hypothesis, inequality in bequests is larger for countries 
with permissive inheritance law than in those with strict inheritance law, based on evidence 
on post-succession firm ownership for our sample of family firms (described in Section III B 
below). Using data obtained via a questionnaire sent to the family firms that experience in-
family succession (with a 51.9 percent response rate), we find that in countries where 
inheritance law is more permissive (i.e., where the limit in Column 4 of Table 1 exceeds the 
median value) (i) the controlling heir’s median stake is larger (25 percent) than in countries 
with stricter laws (19 percent), (ii) the median aggregate stake of other family shareholders is 
smaller (6 percent against 20 percent), (iii) the median number of these shareholders is lower 
(1.5 versus 2.7), and (iv) the distribution of equity stakes within the family is more 
concentrated (the Herfindahl index of family shareholders’ stakes being 0.6781 against 
0.4152).
24 For all these variables, the median values differ significantly across the two groups 
of countries at the 5 percent confidence level. So there are considerable deviations from equal 
                                                 
21 The legality index is a weighted average of the legal indicators by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). 
22 While equal sharing was the rule in his entire sample of 1050 households’ probate records from Connecticut, 
Menchik found that in the sub-sample of estates in which a family farm or business was held, sharing among all 
children was “15-29 percent more unequal than for the full sample”: specifically, in this sub-sample equal 
sharing is observed only in 25 out of 73 cases. 
23 Audrey Light and Kathleen McGarry (2004) report that in the U.S. “in any given year, approximately 75% of 
parents who make inter vivos transfers to their children, give unequal amounts. Even when making bequests—
where equal division is the norm—as many as 20% of parents treat their children unequally” (p. 1669). 
24 The sample includes 287 observations from countries with permissive inheritance law (above median) and 207 
from countries with strict inheritance law (below median).  23
sharing (at least in family firm ownership), and in countries with permissive inheritance law 
family firm ownership is more concentrated in the hands of the controlling heir, and less in 




B. Firm-Level Data 
We draw financial and accounting data from the Worldscope and Compustat data bases for 
20,514 publicly listed companies from the 38 countries listed in Panel A of Table 1 over the 
period 1990-2006.  We apply two screens: first, we only keep firms for which 6 years of 
financial and accounting data are available; second, we remove financial companies. These 
two screens reduce the sample to 14,982 companies. 
For these firms, we seek to identify whether their ultimate owner is a family blockholder 
or not. A major obstacle is that in many firms the largest shareholder is a private company or 
a nominee account, in which case we need to identify the owner of these private companies to 
establish if the ultimate owner of the listed firm is a family or not. We first try to supplement 
the scant ownership information in Worldscope with hand-collected data taken from company 
websites as of 2007,
26 and – for European firms only – with data from the ownership file of 
AMADEUS for 2002. Taken together, these sources lead to a precise identification of the 
ultimate blockholder for less than 8 percent of our sample (1,194 firms). We therefore resort 
to contacting directly 13,788 of the remaining firms to get more precise information about 
                                                 
25 This evidence is consistent comparing the scant international evidence available from other studies. In France 
the estimated frequency of equal sharing is over 92 percent (Luc Arrondel and Anne Laferrère, 1992) and in 
Sweden it is 91.4 percent (Henry Ohlsson, 2007), which both exceed the highest estimates of the frequency of 
equal sharing in the U.S., i.e. 77 percent in Mark O. Wilhelm (1996)  and 70.5 percent in Menchik (1980). 
26 We learned whether the firm’s founding family is still present in the ownership structure and on the size of its 
stake either from the “company history” page or the “investor relations” page of the web site. If the main 
shareholder is a foundation or a private firm, we sought information on its beneficial owners or controlling 
family by looking at the respective web sites. If the foundation or private firm is controlled by a group of people 
with the same last name, these are considered as the family controlling the company.  24
their ultimate owner, obtaining responses from 7,591 firms.
27 For the 5,269 non-responding 
firms, we resort to the data in Mara Faccio and Larry H. P. Lang (2002) for European and by 
Stijn Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) for East Asian firms, as long as they concern firms 
that they classify as “widely held”.
28 This allows us to match 1,406 more firms. For U.S. 
firms, we collect information about their ownership from the 20-F forms or proxy statements 
every two years over the same period.
29 
This data collection effort allows us to classify 11,115 firms as family or non-family. We 
define family firms as those where the ultimate owner is a family blockholder and owns at 
least 20 percent of the cash flow rights.
30 This baseline definition, which is stricter than those 
used by the literature,
31 leaves us with 3,558 family firms. We then winsorize the sample by 
removing the top and bottom 5 percent of the companies by ratio of capital expenditure to 
assets, in order to remove the influence of outliers. This leaves us with a final sample of 
10,004 firms, out of which 3,157 are classified as family firms. 
For family firms, we obtain further information on (i) whether the family blockholder is 
involved in the firm’s active management (the CEO is a family member or the family is 
present on the Board of Directors), and (ii) whether there has been a succession between 1985 
and 2006.  We define succession as control being handed over to offspring or close relatives 
of the entrepreneur from the previous generation. This information is obtained by either 
contacting the firm directly (for 2,346 firms) or consulting the “company history” segment of 
                                                 
27 We ask each firm: (a) whether in 2006 or 2007 its ultimate owner was a family blockholder, either directly or 
indirectly, and (b) if so, whether the family blockholder was always present between 1990 and 2006. 
28 We do not use ownership data from these two studies for firms that they classify as family firms because for 
our purposes their data have two significant constraints. First, their ownership data were collected around 1996, 
so that they would miss firms that went public after. Second, these studies classify as family firms those listed 
firms whose largest shareholder is an “unlisted company”; however, as shown by Julian Franks et al. (2009) for a 
sample of four European countries, the ultimate owner of an unlisted company need not be a family blockholder. 
29 For most U.S. firms we can only find the 20-F forms or proxy statements starting from 1996. In these cases, if 
we determine that in 1996 a firm can be classified as a family firm, then we assume that it is classified as such 
also in 1990. In these cases, we checked that the family blockholder did not buy its stake at any point between 
1990 and 1996 by searching the Lexis-Nexis data base. 
30 We cannot use a cut-off based on voting rights, since for much of our sample this information is not available.  
31 In particular, existing studies for the U.S. use a 5 percent threshold for the family blockholder’s stake to 
classify a firm as family-owned (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006)).  25
the company’s web site (in the case of 239 firms). Since it is reasonable to expect that a 
succession’s impact will be felt after the transfer of control has occurred, we look for 
successions also before 1990, which is the first year of our financial and accounting sample. 
Out of our 3,157 family firms, 1,078 are found to have experienced a succession over the 21-
year period from 1985 to 2006. This sample includes 952 family firms in which the family 
CEO passed control to another family member and 126 in which he/she turned control over to 
an outside manager. We also ascertain that 1,507 firms did not have any succession,
32 while 
for 572 we are unable to make a determination. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the Capex ratio, sales growth, total assets, market-
to-book value and ownership concentration for the companies in the sample. It also breaks 
down these statistics by family and non-family firms (Panels B and C), and further 
decomposes family firms depending on whether they are in strict or permissive inheritance 
law countries (Panels D and E),
33 and in countries with weak or strong investor protection, as 
measured by anti-director rights (Panels F and G).  
[Insert Table 3] 
The mean Capex ratio for the entire sample is 7.11 percent. Panels B and C show that on 
average family and non-family firms do not have significantly different Capex ratios (0.0721 
and 0.0697) and sales growth (12.28 and 12.79 percent). However, family firms are 
significantly smaller size by total assets ($1,310 million versus $2,109 million) and larger 
book-to-market ratios (1.60 versus 1.43).
34 Accordingly, we shall control for these two 
variables in our investment regressions. As expected, ownership concentration is larger in 
                                                 
32 This sample also contains firms that had a succession before 1985.  
33 We define as countries with strict inheritance law those where the largest share that can be bequeathed to a 
single child (in the presence of 2 children and a surviving spouse) does not exceed the median of the 38 countries 
sample (0.667). Remaining countries are defined as having permissive inheritance law. This results in 2,066 and 
1,091 family firms in strict and permissive inheritance law countries, respectively. The greater numerosity of the 
first subsample partly arises from the 8 countries exactly at the median value (Austria, Brazil, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Taiwan and Uruguay) being classified as strict inheritance law countries. 
34 The differences in size and market-to-book ratios are statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively.   26
family firms (39 percent) than in non-family ones (16 percent), and the main shareholders 
tend to be families in the former and institutional blockholders in the latter.  
More importantly, Panels D and E show that on average family firms in countries with 
permissive inheritance laws have larger Capex ratio than their counterparts in countries with 
strict inheritance laws (0.0795 versus 0.0682), higher sales growth (12.95 and 12.15 percent) 
and larger size by total assets ($1,551 million versus $1,209 million), while they have similar 
market-to-book ratios (1.65 and 1.62). They also have lower ownership concentration (33 
versus 42 percent).
35 These univariate tests provide the first empirical indication that family 
firms in countries with permissive inheritance laws invest more and grow faster than those in 
countries with strict inheritance laws, even though they have similar investment opportunities. 
The same picture emerges when we compare family firms in countries with high investor 
protection (Panel F) with those in low investor protection countries (Panel G). This suggests 
the need to control for investor protection in our investment regression.  
Table A1 in the Appendix shows that in the Worldscope data under our definition the 
breakdown between family and non-family firms is fairly consistent with the literature. 
Family firms are more prevalent in civil law countries and less so in common law countries. 
For example, they account for more than 44 percent of the firms in Brazil, France, Germany, 
Italy, Mexico, Spain, South Korea, Sweden and Taiwan whereas they are less than 24 percent 
of the firms in Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States. 
Table A2 shows that all sectors are well represented in the sample.
36 In most sectors, the 
breakdown between family and non-family firms is rather balanced, and their ratio appears to 
reflect mainly the importance of the efficient scale of operation and capital intensity, the 
incidence of family firms being larger in sectors with low capital-intensity and minimal scale. 
 
                                                 
35 Capex, size and ownership concentration of family firms are significantly different between countries with 
permissive and strict inheritance laws at the 5 percent confidence level, and sales growth differs at the 10 percent 
level, while market-to-book ratio is not significant different at any conventional level. 
36 We map the SIC 3-digit codes of Worldscope onto the ISIC codes used by RZ.  27
IV. The Evidence 
We use several different methods to test the main predictions of the model empirically. In 
Section IV A, we use cross-sectional estimates based on the entire sample of firms, with two 
different specifications. The first tests only for the differential effect of inheritance law on the 
investment of family and non-family firms; the second also tests for the effect of inheritance 
law on non-family firms, which we expect to be zero. In Section IV B, we repeat the 
estimation for a sub-sample of family firms that experience succession and another of those 
that do not. In Section IV C, we turn to panel data estimation for the subset of family firms 
that experience succession, to test whether for these firms investment changes around the 
succession date and whether the magnitude of this change is related to inheritance law and 
investor protection. Next, Section IV D investigates whether the effects uncovered for 
investment extend to firms’ growth. Finally, Section V D presents several robustness checks.     
 
A. Cross-Sectional Regressions: Entire Sample 
 Our first specification provides a simple and direct test of the model, based on the differential 
effect of inheritance law on family and non-family firms.  The dependent variable is the 
firm’s average investment rate over the sample period, defined as the ratio of capital 
expenditure (Capex) to total assets ( jsc I ), where j identifies the firm, s the sector and c the 
country. This variable is regressed on sector effects  s α  (s = 1,…, S) and country effects  c δ (c 
= 1,…, C), on a family firm dummy ( jsc F )
37 and a set of interactions between this dummy 
and investor protection  c IP , inheritance law permissiveness  c H  and their product  cc IPH ⋅ . As 
additional controls, the explanatory variables include the log of the firm’s initial market-to-
book ratio,  jsc MB , and of its initial total assets,  jsc A , and their interactions with the family 
firm dummy. The initial market-to-book ratio and total assets, measured in the first year for 
                                                 
37 Set to 1 if there is a family blockholder with at least 20 percent of the firm’s cash flow rights and 0 otherwise.  28
which data are available in Worldscope, control for the firm’s investment opportunities and 
size.  Therefore, the specification is: 
           () 01 2 3 4 5
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The model’s main testable predictions are that  2 0 β >  and  3 0 β > ; that is, the 
permissiveness of inheritance law  c H  has a differential impact on family and non-family 
firms, both directly and through its interaction with  c IP . Owing to the presence of both family 
and non-family firms in our sample, this methodology allows us to identify the effect of these 
legal variables through their differential impact on these two types of firms, while controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity at the country and industry levels via fixed effects.  
These estimates are given in Table 4, where standard errors are corrected for clustering at the 
country and sector level. In each column, the degree of investor protection  c IP  is measured by 
a different index: (a) the revised anti-director rights index of La Porta et al. (1998) in column 
1, (b) the self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008) in column 2, (c) the anti-director rights 
index of Holger Spamann (2008) in column 3, and (d) the creditor rights index of Djankov, 
Caralee McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) in column 4.
38 Employing these indices allows us to 
probe the robustness of our results, as the literature offers no clear consensus on the 
appropriate indicator of investor protection. We also include a measure of creditor rights 
protection because debt is an important source of finance for family firms.  
[Insert Table 4] 
The most important result to emerge from Table 4 is that inheritance law permissiveness 
does have a strong positive impact on family firms’ compared to non-family firms’ 
                                                 
38 The number of observations in columns 3 and 4 falls to 9,995 from 10,004 because for Iceland there are no 
values for the Anti-Director Rights Index of Spamann (2008) and the Creditor Rights Index of Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007).  29
investment. Three of the four coefficient estimates of  2 β  are significantly different from zero 
at the 5 percent level and in all instances the impact is economically significant.  
Second, the coefficient  3 β  is also positive and significant, which means that the effect of 
permissive inheritance law is amplified when investor protection is strong. The estimate of  3 β  
is statistically significant at the 10 percent level when investor protection is measured by anti-
director rights (Column 1) and when measured by the self-dealing index (Column 2); it is not 
significant when the measure is the creditor rights index.  
In most cases the impact of permissive inheritance law on family firms’ investment is 
economically significant. To understand its economic magnitude, we consider an increase of 
the index of inheritance law permissiveness from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile, that is, from 
0.625 to 1, which is twice the standard deviation of the inheritance law index in our sample, in 
a country with the mean self-dealing index (which in our sample is Belgium, whose index is 
0.54). This change in inheritance permissiveness increases the Capex ratio of family firms by 
0.0080, which is equivalent to slightly more than 11 percentage points of the mean Capex 
ratio of family firms (0.072).
39 Similar if smaller impacts are obtained using the two anti-
director rights indices and the creditor rights index to measure investor protection. 
It should be stressed that the effect of inheritance law obtains for family firms only, not 
for all firms with concentrated ownership:  if the regressions in Table 4 are re-estimated 
replacing the family firm dummy with a blockholder dummy (that is 1 if there is a family or 
non-family blockholder with at least 20 percent of the shares, and 0 otherwise), the 
coefficients of the inheritance law interactions are no longer significant. 
The other estimates in Table 4 show higher investment in family than non-family firms, 
though the difference is not statistically significant and increases as investor protection 
improves; this result too is statistically weak, being significant at the 10 percent confidence 
                                                 
39 To obtain this economic impact we use the estimates of the two interaction terms that include inheritance laws 
(β2 and β3).  30
level only for the revised anti-director rights index and the self-dealing index. The estimates 
also indicate that firms’ investment opportunities and initial assets increase investment, but 
that these variables do not have differential effects on family and non-family firms. 
A limitation of the specification of Table 4 is that it bears only on the differential impact 
of inheritance law on family relative to non-family firms: it does not permit an estimate of the 
impact of inheritance law on non-family firms, which according to our model should be nil. 
Testing this hypothesis would require including inheritance law among the explanatory 
variables, which is not feasible in this specification, this variable being perfectly collinear 
with the country effects. To investigate this further prediction, while taking into account that 
in our model  c H  and  c IP  should affect family firms only if they are financially constrained, 
we adopt a second specification. This is based on the approach proposed by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), suitably adapted for our different level of aggregation (firm as opposed to 
industry level) and our focus on inheritance law and investor protection (as opposed to 
financial development). Rajan and Zingales construct their test by first identifying each 
industry’s need for external finance from firm-level data for the U.S., under the assumption 
that financial development is greatest in that country. Then they interact this industry-level 
“external dependence” variable with a country-level proxy for the degree of financial 
development (so as to obtain a variable that measures the extent to which financial 
development constrains the growth of each industry in each country) and use this interacted 
variable in a regression for industry-level growth. Financial dependence measures each 
industry’s need for external finance from U.S. firm-level data, on the assumption that for U.S. 
listed firms access to financial markets is not an obstacle to investment. Thus, differences 
across U.S. firms in reliance on external finance mainly reflect differences in funding 
requirements due to differences in technology. The methodology rests on the assumption that 
these technology-driven capital requirements vary across industries but not across countries.  31
In our context, the main advantage of this methodology is that by interacting legal 
variables with the sectoral index of financial dependence ( s D ), it allows us to identify the 
coefficients of these variables for both family and non-family firms, while still including fixed 
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country and industry level. More 
specifically, the equation to be estimated includes a set of interactions of financial dependence 
s D  with investor protection  c IP , inheritance law permissiveness  c H  and their product 
cc IPH ⋅ , in addition to the variables in (7): 
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In the context of specification (8), we have two testable predictions: not only  2 0 β >  and 
3 0 β > , that is,  c H  should have a larger impact on family than on non-family firms; but also 
7 0 β =  and  8 0 β = , i.e.  c H  should have zero impact on non-family firms. A third prediction 
that can be tested is whether financial constraints affect the investment of the two groups of 
firms, which can be tested by looking at the coefficients of  c IP : specifically,  6 0 β >  and 
16 0 β β +>  would indicate, respectively, that non-family and family firms are financially 
constrained, while  1 0 β >  would imply that the financial constraints faced by family firms are 
more stringent than those of non-family firms.  
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 5 confirms the main results of Table 4.
40 The interaction between the family firm 
dummy, financial dependence and inheritance law permissiveness has a positive and 
significant coefficient ( 2 0 β > ). Also the interaction of these three variables with investor 
protection is positive ( 3 0 β > ), and significantly different from zero in columns 1 and 2. In 
                                                 
40 In estimating equation (8), we drop companies from the United States from the sample (as also done by Rajan 
and Zingales 1998), since our identifying assumption is that U.S. listed firms are financially unconstrained.   32
other words, the differential benefit of permissive inheritance law for family over non-family 
firms is greater in countries where investor protection is stronger. The standard errors in the 
table are clustered at the country and sector level. 
The additional information provided by the estimates in Table 5 is that the interaction 
terms that include inheritance law but exclude the family firm dummy are not significantly 
different from zero; that is, the hypotheses  7 0 β =  and  8 0 β =  cannot be rejected. This is as 
expected: inheritance law matters only for family firms, whose effect is already controlled for 
by the terms whose coefficients are  2 β  and  3 β . 
To gauge the overall economic significance of the estimated effect of inheritance laws on 
family firms, we consider an increase in the index of inheritance law permissiveness from the 
25
th to the 75
th percentile, that is, from 0.625 to 1, which is twice the standard deviation of the 
inheritance law index in our sample. We assess the overall impact on family firm investment 
using the estimates of the interaction terms that include inheritance law permissiveness and 
the family firm dummy ( 2 β ,  3 β ,  7 β  and  8 β ) shown in Column 2. This exercise is performed 
for an industry with mean financial dependence (0.31) and a country with the mean level of 
self-dealing index (0.54). Such a change in inheritance law permissiveness is estimated to 
increase the Capex ratio of family firms by almost 0.0085, which is slightly less than 12 
percent of its sample mean. Similarly, the estimates in columns 1, 3 and 4 imply an impact of 
13, 12 and 8 percent of the mean family firms’ Capex ratio, respectively. 
Moreover, the positive and significant estimate of the coefficient  6 β  of the interaction 
between financial dependence and investor protection indicates that an improvement in 
investor protection promotes investment in both types of firms. The evidence that the 
financial constraints are more stringent for family firms is rather tenuous, since the coefficient 
1 β , though positive, is imprecisely estimated in most specifications.   33
Finally, the estimates of Table 5 confirm that, consistent with our findings in Table 4, 
family firms tend to invest more than non-family firms (though again the difference is not 
statistically significant); and as expected, the coefficients of initial assets and market-to-book 
ratio are both positive and significant. 
 
B. Cross-Sectional Regressions: Family Firms with and without Succession 
The timing of inheritance law’s impact on family firms’ investments should be around the 
intergenerational transfer of control, when entrepreneurs allocate stakes to their controlling 
and non-controlling heirs. Hence, we expect the impact of inheritance laws to be stronger in 
family firms that experience a succession. To test this prediction, we divide the sample of 
family firms into those that experienced a succession (a control transfer from the entrepreneur 
to his/her offspring or immediate relatives) between 1985 and 2006 and those that did not. 
About a third, 1,078 of the family firms, experienced succession and 1,507 firms did not. For 
572 firms we could not obtain any information, and in another 126 control was transferred to 
a professional manager. 
Our model predicts that the effect of inheritance law should be concentrated in family 
firms that actually underwent a succession during our sample period. To this purpose, we 
restrict the sample to family firms alone, and modify the Rajan-Zingales specification of 
Table 5 by interacting the terms involving inheritance law with a succession dummy  jsc S , 
that equals 1 for family firms that underwent a succession in our sample period, and 0 for 
firms that did not. The resulting specification is: 
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where the coefficients  6 γ  to  10 γ  measure the effect of each variable on family firms’ 
investment, whereas  0 γ  to  5 γ  measure the additional effect connected with succession.  34
Beside non-family firms, the sample excludes family firms for which we have no information 
on succession and those for which succession occurred but control was handed over to an 
outside manager.
41 As a result, the sample shrinks to 2,357 firms.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 confirms that succession in family firms is the major driving force behind the 
results reported in Tables 4 and 5.  In fact,  the coefficients of the interaction variables that 
include inheritance law permissiveness ( 7 γ  and  8 γ ) are positive for the whole sample of 
family firms, but they are only statistically significant at conventional confidence levels and 
economically substantial only for the subsample that experience succession ( 2 γ  and  3 γ ). 
Also the effect of investor protection is present only for family firms that experience 
succession:  1 γ  is positive and significantly different from zero, while  6 γ  is small and 
imprecisely estimated. Only for firms that actually undergo succession the frictions due to 
strict inheritance laws influence investment, and make financing constraints binding. 
  
C. Panel Regressions: Family Firms before and after Succession 
Another way of investigating the impact of succession on family firm investments is to 
examine capital expenditure before and after such an event. Our model predicts that in these 
cases investment will decrease more in countries with restrictive inheritance laws. As a 
preliminary step to gauge how inheritance law affects the pattern of investment around the 
succession date, in Figure 3 we plot the average Capex ratio for the 952 family firms where 
in-family succession occurred, separately for a sub-sample of firms where inheritance law is 
permissive (above-median permissiveness) and another sub-sample where it is strict (below-
median permissiveness). The figure shows that firms in countries with strict inheritance law 
experience a large drop in investment: the mean Capex ratio drops from 0.079 in the five 
                                                 
41 It also excludes U.S. firms, since our identifying assumption is that U.S. listed firms are financially 
unconstrained.  35
years before succession to 0.057 in the subsequent nine years – the difference being 
significant at the 10 percent level. In contrast, in countries with permissive inheritance law the 
mean Capex ratio drops only from 0.086 to 0.079, and the difference is not statistically 
different from zero. This suggests that the effect of inheritance law permissiveness on family 
firm investment occurs precisely around the time of succession. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
To investigate this point in a panel framework, we define a firm-level “succession period” 
dummy variable  jt S , which for each firm j is equal to 1 during and after the succession and 0 
previous to it,
42 and estimate two specifications. The first is: 
() 12 3 4 5 16 1 jt j t c c c c jt jt jt II P H I P H S M B A δδ φ φ φ φ φ φ − − =+ ++ + + ⋅ ⋅+ + ,    (10) 
where  j δ  are firm fixed effects,  t δ  are calendar year effects, and the last two explanatory 
variables are the log of the market-to-book ratio and of total assets, both lagged by one year. 
The second specification is based on the Rajan-Zingales methodology: 
      () 12 3 4 5 16 1 jt j t s c s c s c c jt jt jt ID I P D H D I P H S M B A δδ φ φ φ φ φ φ −− =+ ++ ⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅⋅ ⋅+ + .   (11) 
In both specifications, the dependent variable is the ratio of Capex of firm j in year t to its 
total assets in year  1 t − ; all other variables are defined as above.  
We estimate both specifications on two samples: first, the sub-sample of 952 family firms 
that experienced in-family succession,
43 and second, the whole sample of family firms, 
removing only (a) those for which we have no information about succession and (b) those in 
which succession occurred but led control by an outside manager. In this second approach, the 
sample consists of 2,459 family firms. For the sake of brevity, in Table 7 we present only the 
results of specification (10), estimated for the sample of family firms with succession. The 
                                                 
42 Due to its time dimension, the “succession period” dummy  jt S  differs from the cross-sectional “succession” 
dummy  jsc S
 
used in equation (9) and Table 6 to identify firms that undergo a succession. 
43 Thus excluding successions in which control was passed to an outside manager.  36
results that we obtain with the larger sample are similar, and indeed statistically and 
economically stronger. Also the results obtained with specification (11) are qualitatively 
similar. The standard errors of the estimates are corrected for clustering at the company level.  
[Insert Table 7]  
Succession has a strong and significant negative impact on family firm investment 
( 1 0 φ < ). The impact is economically significant: the implied fall in the investment ratio 
(0.012) is approximately 16 percent of its sample mean. But permissive inheritance law is 
found to mitigate this negative impact (or, conversely, strict law to exacerbate it), as shown by 
the fact that the estimated coefficient  3 φ  is positive and precisely estimated. The estimated 
coefficient  4 φ  for the triple interactive term is also positive but is significant only when we 
use the revised anti-director rights index or the self-dealing index (at the 10 percent level). 
The mitigating influence of permissive inheritance law is considerable: taking together the 
impact from both coefficient estimates we find that an increase in inheritance law 
permissiveness from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile decreases the negative impact of succession 
by almost 11 percentage points, bringing its net effect down to 5 percent of the sample mean.  
Better investor protection is found to have a similar mitigating influence. To gauge the 
overall impact, one must add the estimated coefficient of the succession dummy, 1 φ , that of its 
interaction with investor protection,  2 φ , and that of the interaction with investor protection 
and inheritance law permissiveness,  4 φ . For example, increasing investor protection (gauged 
by the self-dealing index) by 1 standard deviation away from its mean decreases the negative 
impact of succession by almost 5 percentage points of the sample mean. This mitigating 
effect, though precisely estimated only when using the anti-director rights index and the self-
dealing index, is consistent with the view that stronger investor protection allows family firms 
to suffer less from the increased stringency of financial constraints around succession. 
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D. Effects on Growth 
Since our model implies that inheritance law also affects family firms’ growth, we seek to 
determine whether the results reported so far for investment extend to growth. Table 8 shows 
the estimates obtained replacing sales growth for investment as the dependent variable in 
specification (8).
44 As we require data on sales for at least seven consecutive years, missing 
data reduce the family firms to 1,988 and the non-family firms to 5,097.    
[Insert Table 8] 
For the main explanatory variables, most of the coefficients are lower and less precisely 
estimated than in the corresponding investment regressions in Table 5. But the coefficient of 
the interaction between the family firm dummy, financial dependence and inheritance law 
permissiveness is positive and both statistically and economically significant, confirming the 
results obtained for investment in Table 5. Increasing the index of inheritance law 
permissiveness from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile increases family firms’ growth by 9 to 10.5 
percent of the sample mean, depending on the specification: that is, sales growth rises to 
between 13.37 and 13.58 percent, up from a sample mean of 12.28 percent. The coefficients 
of the interaction between the family firm dummy, financial dependence and investor 
protection are positive but in general they lack statistical significance, implying that growth is 
no more sensitive to better investor protection in family than in non-family firms. The 
coefficient of the interaction between financial dependence, inheritance law permissiveness 
and investor protection is not significantly different from zero. 
 
E. Robustness Checks 
Finally, we perform a variety of robustness checks of the empirical results reported obtained 
in Tables 4 and 5. Their results are shown in Table 9.
45  
                                                 
44 Similar results are obtained with specification (7). 
45 We have also performed several other robustness checks that are not reported for brevity. Specifically, we 
have re-estimated specifications (7) and (8) with industry-country interaction fixed effects, rather than industry  38
[Insert Table 9] 
In Panel A, we control for the effect of the tax rate on bequests, using data for the top 
marginal transfer rate from parent to children from the Coopers and Lybrand International 
Tax Summaries.
46 This may be imprecise as a measure of actual inheritance taxes, as it hardly 
does justice to the complexity of national tax codes and to the different degree of evasion or 
avoidance of inheritance taxes. We adapt specification (8), by adding a new interaction term 
between the family firm dummy, financial dependence and inheritance taxes. In accordance 
with the model, this variable is also entered interactively with financial dependence, since we 
expect inheritance taxes to compress investment only for financially constrained firms. 
Although the results for  2 β  and  3 β  remain largely unchanged when inheritance tax is 
included, their statistical and economic significance decreases by comparison with Table 5. 
The effect of inheritance tax on investment is negative and larger for family firms, consistent 
with the model and with the results reported by Margarita Tsoutsoura (2009) for Greek family 
firms, but is imprecisely estimated.
47  
Second, we check whether our results survive when only civil law countries are 
considered, to counter the possible criticism that, given the correlation between our 
inheritance law index and common law countries, the index essentially just captures the 
difference between common law and civil law systems. Panel B of Table 9 shows that the 
main results from Table 5 do survive even for this subsample, although with two differences: 
                                                                                                                                                         
and country separately: the estimates regarding the effect of inheritance law and investor protection have 
remained qualitatively unchanged. We have also estimated specification (7) dropping the observations for Japan 
and the U.K. and the U.S. (the countries with the largest number of companies in our sample), and the results 
actually become stronger. Finally, in specification (8) we have added interactions between financial dependence 
and other country characteristics that might perhaps affect differentially the investment of family and non-family 
firms, i.e., legal origin, religion and quality of enforcement (measured by “judicial efficiency” or by the “legality 
index”). In all these additional regressions, the coefficients of the interaction terms involving these country 
characteristics are not significantly different from zero, while the interaction between inheritance law 
permissiveness, financial dependence and the family firm dummy remains positive and significant.   
46 These data were kindly provided by Antoinette Schoar. 
47 We also test another prediction by the model – that the effect of inheritance law is lowered by the presence of 
inheritance taxes – by splitting the sample and re-estimating the specifications of Table 5 separately for the 
countries where the inheritance tax rate is below and above the median in our sample of countries. The 
coefficients do not significantly differ across these two sub-samples. The results are not shown for brevity.  39
the size and precision of the estimate of  2 β  are less than for the full sample, and the estimate 
of  3 β  is no longer statistically significant. This is to be expected, since excluding the common 
law countries sharply diminishes the variability in the inheritance law index. Even so, the 
main difference between the response of family and non-family firms’ investment to 
inheritance laws remains largely unchanged. 
Third, it is worth checking whether the effect of inheritance law on family firms’ 
investment in our regressions is not really capturing the effect of social norms: in particular, 
in countries where parents care more for their children they may opt more equal sharing than 
in other countries, irrespective of what is required by inheritance law. If so, measures of 
“family values” should differentially affect investment in family and non-family firms, and 
entirely absorb the explanatory power of inheritance law. To investigate this point, we draw a 
measure of “family values” from the World Value Survey,
48 and expand the specification of 
equation (8) to include two additional explanatory variables:  the interaction between financial 
dependence and family values, and the interaction of these two variables with the family firm 
dummy. As shown in Panel C of Table 9, the coefficients of the interaction terms that include 
family values are not significantly different from zero, while the interaction between 
inheritance law permissiveness, financial dependence and the family firm dummy remains 
                                                 
48 Consistent with Alberto Alesina and Paola Giuliano (2007), we rely on the 1995-97 and 1999-2000 waves of 
the World Value Surveys for the 38 countries in our sample. We define “family values” as the negative of the 
weakness of family ties, and measure the latter by extracting the first principal component of the answers given 
to three separate questions in the World Value Surveys that capture the beliefs about the importance of the 
family, the various responsibilities of parents and children to each other, and the love and respect for the parents. 
The first question asks how important is the family in the life of an individual (the answer can take values from 1 
to 4, where 1 is “very important” and 4 “not important at all”). The second question asks the respondent to 
answer with which statement s/he is in agreement with: (1) “Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s 
parents are, one must always love and respect them” or (2) “One does not have the duty to respect and love 
parents who have not earned it”. Likewise the third question asks the respondent to answer with which statement 
s/he is in agreement with: (1) “It is the parents’ duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their 
own well-being” or (2) “Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well 
being for the sake of their children”. The answers to the second and third questions can be either 1 or 2. In our 
sample, this measure of the weakness of family ties is largest in Germany and smallest in the Philippines. In 
other words, family values are weakest in Germany and strongest in the Philippines.    
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positive and significant. This suggests that inheritance law is not simply acting as a proxy for 
pro-family social norms. 
Our next robustness check involves different definitions of family firm. In Panel D, we 
experiment with a more stringent definition of family firm than in our previous estimated:  we 
requires the family blockholder not only to own at least 20 percent of the cash flow rights (as 
in the estimates reported so far) but also to participate in the firm’s active management either 
as CEO position or as member of the board of directors. We find that the results become 
stronger with this more restrictive definition, probably because this reduces potential 
contamination of the sample by non-family firms mistakenly classified as family-controlled. 
Another dimension in which the definition of family firms can be relaxed or tightened 
concerns the threshold equity stake that the family is required to hold. Indeed many studies in 
the literature employ a lower threshold that the 20 percent required by our baseline definition. 
Instead of experimenting with various thresholds, in Panel E we replace the family dummy 
with the actual stake held by the family blockholder, as a measure of the extent to which the 
firm can be considered as family controlled. This flexible specification allows us to gauge the 
effect of inheritance law and investor protection for different levels of the family 
blockholder’s stake: for instance, changing inheritance law permissiveness from the 25
th to 
the 75
th percentile that is, from 0.625 to 1, is associated with one percentage point increase of 
the investment ratio if the family’s stake is 5 percent, almost three percentage points if the 
stake is 10 percent, and more than ten percentage points if it is 40 percent.
49 So also in this 
sense, the effect becomes stronger the more restrictive is the definition of family firms. 
Our final robustness check concerns the definition of financial dependence in specification 
(8). Since the median U.S. firm in each industry is larger than its analogue in most other 
countries, it may be more reasonable to use the financial dependence of the median U.S. firm 
in the size class of its non-U.S. analogue. To do so, we repeat the estimation with a size-
                                                 
49 The mean ownership of the family blockholder in our sample is 38 percent.  41
dependent measure of financial dependence, splitting U.S. companies into large, medium, and 
small firms, and computing financial dependence for the median in each of three subsamples. 
As shown by Panel F of Table 9, this alternative measure of financial dependence leaves our 
basic results qualitatively unaffected: family firms’ investment continues to be sensitive to the 
inheritance law index, but not non-family firms’ investment. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The literature produced by academic research on family firms is vast and rapidly expanding, 
but very little attention has been devoted to the role that inheritance norms may have in 
constraining their investment and growth. This is surprising, considering that unlike 
economists, businessmen are keenly aware of the problem, the more so as the impact of 
inheritance law has been amplified in recent years by the shift from the traditional family to 
extended families, with children being born in different marriages or out of wedlock. For 
example, in Italy family firms are advocating less stringent inheritance law. In the words of 
one, “Today the family is no longer what it was sixty years ago: […] The need to adapt the 
norms on inheritance law, giving the testator more flexibility in disposing of his assets, should 
be self-evident”.
50 Indeed, restrictive inheritance rules are seen as an obstacle to the 
generational transfer of control: “In the likely case where the designated (controlling) heir 
does not have enough wealth to compensate the other heirs, generational transfer would be 
possible only if the family firm had a large borrowing capacity”.
51 Under the current law, the 
potential claims of non-controlling heirs are so large that they can destabilize even the largest 
family firms, such as Fiat.
52 
                                                 
50 “E l’eredità? Dev’essere libera”, Corriere Economia, 2 April 2007, page 9. 
51 “Sulla legittima è tempo per i correttivi”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 7 May 2007, page 35. 
52 In June 2007 Margherita Agnelli challenged the inheritance agreement subscribed by all heirs after the death 
of Giovanni Agnelli in 2004 because she regarded it as too unfair to the children of their second marriage and 
too favorable to those of her first marriage with Alan Elkann, and especially to John Elkann, heir to Giovanni  42
We have shown that such concerns are consistent both with theory and with evidence. In 
the context of a stylized model of succession in a family firm, larger legal claims by non-
controlling heirs on the founder’s estate lead to lower investment, because they reduce the 
firm’s ability to pledge future income streams to external financiers. We bring this prediction 
to the data, by building an indicator of the degree of permissiveness of inheritance law from 
the viewpoint of a testator who wishes to bequeath the largest possible fraction of the estate to 
a single child. We merge this inheritance law indicator with measures of investor protection 
and with data for 10,004 firms from 38 countries for the period 1990-2006. We find that 
stricter inheritance law is in fact associated with lower investment and slower growth in 
family firms while leaving investment in non-family firms unaffected. Further, the negative 
effect of strict inheritance law on family firms’ investment is exacerbated by poor investor 
protection, again as the model predicts. 
 We also find that the results are driven mostly by family firms that undergo a succession 
in our sample period, and that the effects of inheritance laws are strongest precisely in the 
wake of succession. During and after the transfer of control to the next generation, there is a 
decrease in investment that is more sever if the firm is located in a country with stricter 
inheritance law. In this case too, poor investor protection compounds the effect of strict 
inheritance law, in addition to its direct negative effect on investment. 
Our results are robust to different specifications of the investment equation, and survive if 
the estimation is confined to civil law countries alone, to the inclusion of inheritance tax and 
of a measure of pro-family social norms, to different definitions of family firm and different 
measures of financial dependence.  
                                                                                                                                                          
Agnelli as the head of the FIAT industrial and financial empire. Similar legal battles have occurred in other 
prominent business dynasties, such as Campari, Star, Mondadori, Coin and Marzotto.   43
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TABLE 1 — INHERITANCE LAW PERMISSIVENESS AND INVESTOR PROTECTION AROUND THE 
WORLD 
 
Columns 1 to 5 report the largest share of the estate that in each country a testator can bequeath to a single 
child in the absence (columns 1 and 2) or presence of a surviving spouse (columns 3, 4 and 5), for different 
numbers of children. Columns 6, 7 display the Revised Anti-Director Index and the Self Dealing Index, from 
Djankov et al. (2006). Column 8 shows the median number of children of self-employed workers or business 
owners above age 50 and earning above-median income, drawn from the Health and Retirement Study 
(U.S.), English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (U.K.), and Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe (other European countries).  Panels A and B show data for the 38 countries included in the 
estimation and for 26 other countries respectively. 
 
Panel A. Countries Included in the Estimation 








































Argentina  0.667  0.556  0.667 0.556 0.5 2 0.34  -
Australia  1  1  1 1 1 4 0.76  -
Austria  0.75  0.667  0.833 0.667 0.611 2.5 0.21  2
Belgium  0.667  0.5  0.5 0.333 0.25 3 0.54  2
Brazil  0.75  0.667  0.75 0.667 0.625 5 0.27  -
Canada  1  1  1 1 1 4 0.64  -
Chile  0.75  0.667  0.75 0.625 0.6 4 0.63  -
Colombia  0.75  0.667  0.5 0.375 0.333 3 0.57  -
Denmark  0.75  0.667  0.833 0.667 0.611 4 0.46  2
Finland  0.75  0.667  1 0.75 0.667 3.5 0.46  -
France  0.66  0.5  1 0.66 0.5 3.5 0.38  2
Germany  0.75  0.667  0.75 0.667 0.625 3.5 0.28  2
Greece  0.75  0.667  0.875 0.688 0.625 2 0.22  2
Hong Kong  1  1  1 1 1 5 0.96  -
Iceland  0.667  0.556  0.778 0.556 0.481 4.5 0.24  -
India  1  1  1 1 1 5 0.58  -
Ireland  1  1  0.667 0.667 0.667 5 0.79  -
Israel  1  1  1 1 1 4 0.73  -
Italy  0.667  0.556  0.667 0.5 0.417 2 0.42  2
Japan  0.75  0.667  0.75 0.625 0.583 4.5 0.5  -
Mexico  1  1  1 1 1 3 0.17  -
Netherlands  0.75  0.667  0.75 0.667 0.625 2.5 0.2  2
New Zealand  1  1  1 1 1 4 0.95  -
Norway  0.667  0.556  0.75 0.417 0.305 3.5 0.42  -
Peru  0.667  0.556  0.667 0.556 0.5 3.5 0.45  -
Philippines  0.5  0.333  0.5 0.333 0.25 4 0.22  -
Portugal  0.667  0.556  0.667 0.542 0.472 2.5 0.44  -
South Africa  1  1  1 1 1 5 0.81  -
South Korea  0.75  0.667  0.7 0.643 0.611 4.5 0.47  -
Spain  0.833  0.778  0.667 0.5 0.444 5 0.37  2
Sweden  0.75  0.667  1 0.75 0.667 3.5 0.33  3
Switzerland  0.625  0.5  0.75 0.5 0.417 3 0.27  2
Taiwan  0.75  0.667  0.75 0.667 0.625 3 0.56  -
Thailand  1  1  1 1 1 4 0.81  -
U.K.  1  1  1 1 1 5 0.95  2
U.S.A.  1  1  1 1 1 3 0.65  2
Uruguay  0.667  0.5  0.667 0.5 0.438 1 0.18  -




Panel B. Other Countries  








































Bangladesh  0.5  0.333  0.667 0.333 0.222 - -  -
Bolivia  0.6  0.467  0.8 0.5 0.4 2 0.14  -
Bulgaria  1  1  1 1 1 3 0.65  -
Cayman 1  1  1 1 1 - -  -
Costa Rica  1  1  1 1 1 - -  -
Croatia  0.75  0.68  0.75 0.68 0.625 2.5 0.25  -
Cyprus  0.625  0.5  0.625 0.5 0.438 - -  -
El Salvador  1  1  1 1 1 2 0.43  -
Estonia  0.75  0.667  0.75 0.667 0.625 - -  -
Guatemala  1  1  1 1 1 - -  -
Hungary  0.75  0.667  1 0.75 0.667 2 0.18  -
Jamaica  1  1  1 1 1 4 0.35  -
Jordan  0.5  0.333  0.667 0.333 0.222 1 0.16  -
Kenya  1  1  1 1 1 2 0.21  -
Kuwait  0.5  0.333  0.667 0.333 0.222 - -  -
Latvia  0.75  0.667  0.75 0.667 0.625 4 0.32  -
Lebanon  0.75  0.667  0.9 0.7 0.633 - -  -
Liechtenstein  0.75  0.667  0.666 0.5 0.444 - -  -
Lithuania  0.75  0.667  0.875 0.688 0.625 4 0.36  -
Luxembourg  0.667  0.5  1 0.66 0.5 2 0.28  -
Malta  0.833  0.778  0.75 0.583 0.528 - -  -
Monaco  0.667  0.5  1 0.667 0.5 - -  -
Romania  0.667  0.5  0.875 0.583 0.438 5 0.44  -
Saudi Arabia  0.5  0.333  0.667 0.333 0.222 - -  -
Slovak Rep.  0.75  0.5  0.75 0.5 0.375 3 0.29  -













TABLE 2 — INHERITANCE LAW PERMISSIVENESS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the maximum share that can be bequeathed to a single child in 
the absence or presence of a surviving spouse, for 2 or 3 numbers of children in civil law countries. Panel 
B provides the same statistics for common law countries. Panel C shows the correlation of the maximum 
share that can be bequeathed to a single child with the Revised Anti-Director Index, the Self Dealing Index 
and the ratio of Stock Market Capitalization to GDP drawn from Djankov et al. (2006) and the Legality 












Mean  0.72  0.63  0.60  0.54 
Standard deviation  0.09  0.12  0.15  0.16 
Minimum  0.50  0.33  0.33  0.25 














Mean  1  1  0.96  0.96 
Standard deviation  0  0  0.12  0.12 
Minimum  1  1  0.67  0.67 











































TABLE 3 — COMPANY-LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 10,004 firms from 38 countries over the period from 1990 to 
2006.  Panel B and C report descriptive statistics for the 3,157 family and for the 6,847 non-family firms in the 
sample, respectively. Panels D and E report descriptive statistics for family firms in countries with strict inheritance 
laws and permissive inheritance laws, respectively. Strict inheritance law countries are defined as those where the 
largest share that can be bequeathed to a single child (in the presence of 2 children and a surviving spouse) does not 
exceed the median of the 38 countries sample (0.667), and permissive inheritance law countries as those where this 
share exceeds this median value. Panels F and G report descriptive statistics for family firms in countries with low 
and high investor protection respectively, using the Revised Anti-Director Rights Index of LLSV (1998), using the 
median value of the Index (value of 3.5) to partition the sample. Capex is the ratio of capital expenditure to total 
assets. Sales Growth is the percentage sales growth. Firm Size is the firm’s total assets in millions of U.S. dollars. 
Market-to-Book Ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value of assets less book value of equity, all 
divided by total assets. Ownership Concentration is the percent of cash flow rights of the firm’s largest blockholder.  
 
  Capex  Sales Growth 
(percent) 





Panel A: Total Sample 
Mean  0.0711 12.55  1,858  1.47  23.44 
Std. Dev.  0.0615 10.81  3,601  1.38  10.08 
No. Obs.  10,004 10,004  10,004 10,004  10,004 
 
Panel B: Family Firms 
Mean  0.0721 12.28  1,310  1.60  38.92 
Std. Dev.  0.0639 10.09  2,288  1.41  12.51 
No. Obs.  3,157 3,157  3,157 3,157  3,157 
 
Panel C: Non-Family Firms 
Mean  0.0697 12.79  2,109  1.43  15.73 
Std. Dev.  0.0609 10.99  3,802  1.35  9.20 
No. Obs.  6,847 6,847  6,847 6,847  6,847 
 
Panel D: Family Firms in Countries with Strict Inheritance Laws 
Mean  0.0682 12.15  1,209  1.62  41.91 
Std. Dev.  0.0627 10.48  2,107  1.44  15.28 
No. Obs.  2,066 2,066  2,066 2,066  2,066 
 
Panel E: Family Firms in Countries with Permissive Inheritance Laws 
Mean  0.0795 12.95  1,551  1.65  32.91 
Std. Dev.  0.0650 9.57  2,815  1.49  11.02 
No. Obs.  1,091 1,091  1,091 1,091  1,091 
        
Panel F: Family Firms in Countries with Low Investor Protection 
Mean  0.0701 12.01  1,210  1.59  41.81 
Std. Dev.  0.0635 10.31  1,517  1.40  13.57 
No. Obs.  1,635 1,635  1,635 1,635  1,635 
        
Panel G: Family Firms in Countries with High Investor Protection 
Mean  0.0745 12.52  1,421  1.64  35.91 
Std. Dev.  0.0609 9.61  2,901  1.45  11.51 
No. Obs.  1,522 1,522  1,522 1,522  1,522   50
TABLE 4 — REGRESSIONS OF FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY FIRMS’ INVESTMENT 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression model for 10,004 firms from 38 countries. The dependent variable is the mean of 
the ratio of Capital Expenditure to Total Assets in the previous year. The mean of the ratio is calculated over the period 1990-2006 for all firms for 
which we have at least 6 years of data. The independent variables are as follows: Family Firm is a dummy variable that equals 1 for family firms 
and 0 otherwise; Family Firm × Investor Protection is interaction between the Family Firm dummy variable and a measure of Investor Protection; 
Family Firm × Inheritance Law is the interaction between the Family Firm dummy variable and the maximum share that can be given to a child in 
the presence of a spouse and two children; and Family Firm × Inheritance Law × Investor Protection is the interaction of all three variables. 
Investor Protection is defined as the Revised Anti-Director Rights Index of LLSV (1998) in column 1, the Self Dealing Index of Djankov et al. 
(2008) in column 2, the Anti-Director Rights Index of Spamann (2008) in column 3, and the Creditor Rights Index of Djankov et al. (2007) in 
column 4. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country and sector level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively). 
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Country and Industry Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2  0.2411  0.2582  0.2470  0.1868 
Number of Observations  10,004  10,004  9,995  9,995 
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TABLE 5 — REGRESSIONS OF FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY FIRMS’ INVESTMENT WITH FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression for 9,080 firms from 37 countries (all those in Panel A of Table 1, except the U.S.). 
The dependent variable is the mean of the ratio of Capital Expenditure to Total Assets in the previous year and calculated as described in Table 4. 
The independent variables are as follows: Family Firm is a dummy variable that equals 1 for family firms and 0 otherwise; Family Firm × 
Financial Dependence × Investor Protection is the interaction between Family Firm, Financial Dependence and Investor Protection; Family Firm × 
Financial Dependence × Inheritance Law is the interaction between Family Firm, Financial Dependence and the maximum share that can be given 
to a child in the presence of a spouse and two children; and Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law × Investor Protection is the 
interaction of all four variables. Financial Dependence is drawn from Rajan and Zingales (1998). Investor Protection is defined as the Revised 
Anti-Director Rights Index of LLSV (1998) in column 1, the Self Dealing Index of Djankov et al. (2008) in column 2, the Anti-Director Rights 
Index of Spamann (2008) in column 3, and the Creditor Rights Index of Djankov et al. (2007) in column 4. Standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the country and sector level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively). 
 
 1  2  3  4 




























Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 



























Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 









































Country and Industry Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2  0.2701  0.2924  0.2756  0.2401 
Number of Observations  9,080  9,080  9,071  9,071   52
TABLE 6 — REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR FAMILY FIRMS WITH SUCCESSION AND WITHOUT SUCCESSION 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression model for 2,357 family firms in 37 countries (all those in Panel A of Table 1, 
except the U.S.), for which we can determine whether succession has taken place or not. The sample does not include the 572 family firms for 
which we cannot determine whether succession has taken place or not, and the 126 family firms where control has been passed to a professional 
manager. The dependent variable is the mean of the ratio of Capital Expenditure to Total Assets in the previous year. The mean of the ratio is 
calculated over the period 1990-2006 for all firms for which we have at least 6 years of data. The independent variables are defined as in Table 4. 
Succession is a dummy variable that equals 1 for family firms that have experienced succession and 0 otherwise. Investor Protection is defined as 
the Revised Anti-Director Rights Index of LLSV (1998) in column 1, the Self Dealing Index of Djankov et al. (2008) in column 2, the Anti-
Director Rights Index of Spamann (2008) in column 3, and the Creditor Rights Index of Djankov et al. (2007) in column 4. The other control 
variables, whose coefficients are not shown for brevity, are Log of Initial Market-to-Book and Log of Initial Assets. Standard errors are corrected 
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Succession × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 



























Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 









Country and Industry Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Other Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES  YES  YES 
        
Adjusted R
2  0.3488  0.3402  0.3371  0.3190 
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TABLE 7 — CAPITAL EXPENDITURE IN FAMILY FIRMS AROUND SUCCESSION 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression model for 952 family firms from 36 countries that experienced succession over the 
period 1985-2006. There were no successions in family firms from Iceland and Uruguay. The dependent variable is the ratio of Capital 
Expenditure to Total Assets in the previous year. The independent variables are as follows: Succession Period is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 from the year before succession until the end of the sample period and the value of 0 for all the years before; Succession Period × 
Investor Protection is the interaction between the Succession Period dummy variable and Investor Protection; Succession Period × Inheritance 
Law is the interaction between the Succession Period dummy variable and the maximum share that can be given to a child in the presence of a 
spouse and two children; Succession Period × Inheritance Law × Investor Protection is the interaction of all three variables. Investor Protection is 
defined as the Revised Anti-Director Rights Index of LLSV (1998) in column 1, the Self Dealing Index of Djankov et al. (2008) in column 2, the 
Anti-Director Rights Index of Spamann (2008) in column 3, and the Creditor Rights Index of Djankov et al. (2006) in column 4. The other control 
variables are the Log of Lagged Market-to-Book and Log of Lagged Assets, both of which are lagged by one year. Standard errors are corrected 
for clustering at the company level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively). 
 
 1  2  3  4 


























Succession Period × Investor Protection × 

























Fixed Firm Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Calendar Year Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
        
Adjusted R
2  0.1594  0.1598  0.1567  0.1465 
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TABLE 8 — REGRESSION OF FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY FIRMS SALES GROWTH 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression model for 7,085 firms from 37 countries (all those in Panel A of Table 1, except 
the U.S.). The dependent variable is the mean of sales growth in percentage terms. The mean of the growth rate is calculated over the period 1990-
2006 for all firms for which we have at least 7 consecutive years of sales data. The independent variables are as defined in Table 4. Investor 
Protection is defined as the Revised Anti-Director Rights Index of LLSV (1998) in column 1, the Self Dealing Index of Djankov et al. (2008) in 
column 2, the Anti-Director Rights Index of Spamann (2008) in column 3, and the Creditor Rights Index of Djankov et al. (2007) in column 4. 
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
level, respectively). 
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Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 
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Country and Industry Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2  0.1695  0.1689  0.1695  0.1648 
Number of Observations  7,085  7,085  7,081  7,081   55
TABLE 9 — ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
This table presents robustness checks of the estimates reported in Table 5, expanding the specification of that table or 
restricting its sample. Variables are also defined as in Table 5. In Panel A, explanatory variables include Inheritance 
Tax, defined as the top marginal transfer rate from parent to children, drawn from the Coopers and Lybrand 
International Tax Summaries. In Panel B estimation is restricted to companies incorporated in Civil Law countries, as 
defined by Djankov et al. (2008). In Panel C the explanatory variables include a measure of “family values”, defined 
as the negative of the weakness of family ties, which in turn is the first principal component of the answers given to 
three separate questions in the World Value Surveys. In Panel D we use a more stringent definition of family firms, 
by requiring that family blockholders own at least a 20 percent share and participate in the firm’s management. In 
Panel E the Family Firm dummy is replaced by the actual percent of cash flow rights held by the family blockholder, 
as a measure of the extent to which the firm is family controlled. In Panel F we repeat the estimation with a size-
dependent measure of Financial Dependence, obtained by splitting U.S. companies in Compustat into three sub-
samples respectively formed by large, medium and small firms, and computing financial dependence for the median 
company in each sub-sample. In Panels A to F Investor Protection is defined as the Revised Anti-Director Index in 
column 1, and the Self Dealing Index in column 2.  The Other Control Variables (not reported for brevity) are: 
Family Firm; Log of Initial Market-to-Book; Log of Initial Assets; Family Firm × Log of Initial Market-to-Book; and 
Family Firm × Log of Initial Assets. All regressions include country and industry dummies. Standard errors are 
corrected for clustering at the country and sector level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively). 
 
Panel A. Controlling for Inheritance Taxes 
 
 1  2 












Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 























Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and Industry Effects  YES  YES 
Other Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2  0.3191  0.3241 
Number of Observations  8,379  8,379 
   56
Table 9, continued 
 
Panel B. Civil Law Countries Only 
 
 1  2 












Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 















Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and Industry Effects  YES  YES 
Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2  0.1558  0.1570 
Number of Observations  5,974  5,974 
 
 
Panel C. Family Values vs. Inheritance Law 
 
 1  2 












Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 























Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and Industry Effects  YES  YES 
Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2  0.2281  0.2279 
Number of Observations  9,080  9,080   57
Table 9, continued 
 
Panel D. More Stringent Definition of Family Firms 
 
  Blockholder owns at least of 20 
percent and is present in management 
 1  2 












Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 















Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and Industry Effects  YES  YES 
Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2  0.2982  0.3001 




Panel E. Replacing the Family Dummy with the Family Stake 
 
 1  2 












Family Stake × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 















Financial Dependence × Inheritance Law 





Country and industry effects  YES  YES 
Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2  0.3207  0.3215 
Number of Observations  9,080  9,080 
   58
Table 9, continued 
 
Panel F. Different Definitions of Financial Dependence 
 
 1  2 












Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 















Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and Industry Effects  YES  YES 
Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2  0.3118  0.3122 
Number of Observations  9,080  9,080 
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APPENDIX: TABLE A1 — COMPANY DATA: SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
Panel A. Geographical Distribution of the Sample 
 
 








Argentina 18  27   Japan  1,110  168 
Australia 367  118   Mexico  35  42 
Austria 56  32    Netherlands  64 39 
Belgium 62  32    New  Zealand  30  10 
Brazil 70  101    Norway 144  53 
Canada 329  75    Peru  14  15 
Chile 96  40    Philippines 60 56 
Colombia 12  16    Portugal 39  34 
Denmark 58  41    South  Africa  34  20 
Finland 104  70    South Korea  192  250 
France 428  329    Spain  108  105 
Germany 514  364    Sweden 165  98 
Greece 16  39    Switzerland  135  97 
Hong Kong  62  70   Taiwan  68  72 
Iceland 7  2    Thailand  40  130 
India 30  97    U.K.  1,270  206 
Ireland 82  20    U.S.A.  822  102 
Israel 82  34    Uruguay  2  3 
Italy 104  141    Venezuela  18  9 








Panel B. Industrial Classification of Sample Firms 
 
 










Apparel (322)  53  160    Other industries (390) 610  210 
Basics ex. fert. (3511)  62  58   Paper  products  (341)  53  84 
Beverage (313)  134  48    Petroleum and coal products (354)  147  19 
Drugs (3522)  298  27    Petroleum refining (353) 162  27 
Electric machinery (383)  381  148   Plastic  products  (356)  293  118 
Food products (311) 310  289    Pottery (361)  148  112 
Footwear (324)  20  25    Printing and publishing (342)  170  132 
Furniture (332)  140  128    Professional goods (385) 460  68 
Glass (362)  119  97    Pulp paper (3411)  201  155 
Iron and steel (371)  331  72   Radio  (3832)  95  37 
Leather (323)  88  101    Rubber products (355) 89  106 
Machinery (382)  224  86   Ship  (3841) 117  65 
Metal products (381)  251  91   Spinning  (3211)  50  68 
Motor vehicle (3843)  119 35    Synthetic  resins (3513)  114  34 
Non-ferrous metal (372)  137  89   Textiles  (321)  157  152 
Non-metal products (369)  203  77   Tobacco  (314)  74  11 
Office and computing (3825)  250 78    Transportation  equipment (384)  261  32 

















control to heir 1 
and gives x ≥ u 
to heir 2. 
t = 0  t = 1  t = 2 
Heir 1 raises 
funds to fund 
investment I. 
• Firm produces 
revenue R. 
• Heir 1 diverts a 
fraction φ of R as 
private benefits. 











1 φ −  










unconstrained investment region 









FIGURE 2. FAMILY FIRM INVESTMENT, INVESTOR PROTECTION (1 φ − )  













FIGURE 3. INVESTMENT (RATIO OF CAPEX TO TOTAL ASSETS) IN FAMILY FIRMS  
AROUND THE SUCCESSION YEAR 
 